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Note 
 
DRAWING THE LINE: A FIRST AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK 
FOR PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING IN THE WAKE OF  
RUCHO V. COMMON CAUSE 
KYLE KERAGA* 
Gerrymandering is extremely effective.  In 2011, Maryland Democrats 
drew a district map restricting Republicans to only one of eight congressional 
seats, despite the Republican Party’s consistent thirty-five percent share of 
the statewide popular vote.1  In 2016, North Carolina Republicans 
consolidated their advantage with a map confining Democrats to three of ten 
seats, despite the Democratic Party’s forty-five percent share of the vote.2  In 
each subsequent election, these plans have worked precisely as intended, 
entrenching the mapmakers’ control of their state legislatures despite spirited 
challenges from their state’s minority party.3  This problem is not unique to 
Maryland or North Carolina: Since the 2010 redistricting cycle, as many as 
fifty-nine seats in the House of Representatives have been predetermined, 
election-to-election, by partisan gerrymanders—twenty in favor of 
Democrats, and thirty-nine in favor of Republicans.4 
Democracy is not supposed to work this way—and the voting public 
broadly agrees: Gerrymandering, “the drawing of legislative district lines to 
subordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party in 
power,” is the subject of widespread, bipartisan opposition.5  Contempt for 
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 1.  Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2511 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 2.  Id. at 2510. 
 3.  Id. at 2493, 2510–11. 
 4.  Alex Tausanovitch, The Impact of Partisan Gerrymandering, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(Oct. 1, 2019, 9:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/news/2019/10/01/ 
475166/impact-partisan-gerrymandering/. 
 5.  Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015).  
As recently as 2017, as many as seventy-three percent of Americans expressed support for removing 
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this practice has been a prominent feature of our political culture since the 
earliest days of our Republic6—expressed through political cartoons, art 
galleries, and computer fonts.7  This disdain is well-founded, as partisan 
gerrymanders have substantial suppressive effects on public participation: 
They chill turnout among minority parties, distort accountability between 
voters and their representatives, contribute to ideological segregation among 
the electorate, raise the costs of challenging incumbents, and reinforce a 
pervasive sentiment that participation in our democracy is an exercise in 
futility.8  Seventeen states have addressed this issue by establishing an 
independent redistricting commission through ballot initiatives or legislative 
enactments9; in the remaining thirty-three, disaffected voters are often left to 
seek redress through the judiciary. 
In Rucho v. Common Cause,10 the United States Supreme Court 
declared that partisan gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question 
                                                          
partisanship from the districting process entirely, even if it would cost their party an election.  
Supermajority of Americans Want Supreme Court to Limit Partisan Gerrymandering, CAMPAIGN 
LEGAL CTR. (Sept. 11, 2017), https://campaignlegal.org/press-releases/supermajority-americans-
want-supreme-court-limit-partisan-gerrymandering/. 
 6.  Anna Khomina, Elbridge Gerry and the Original Gerrymander, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. 
AM. HIST. (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.gilderlehrman.org/blog/elbridge-gerry-and-original-
gerrymander/ (describing contemporary disdain for Elbridge Gerry’s original gerrymander). 
 7.  E.g., Harlow G. Unger, Elbridge Gerry’s Monster Salamander that Swallows Votes, HIST. 
NEWS NETWORK (Nov. 3 2019), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/173464 (showcasing 
classic Boston Centinal political cartoon that coined the term “gerrymander”); “Redistricting” – 
City Hall’s New Art Exhibit, LANCASTER PUB. ART (Oct. 30, 2019), 
https://www.lancasterpublicart.com/news/2019/10/30/redistricting-city-halls-new-art-exhibit/ 
(encouraging viewers to treat congressional districts as Rorschach ink blot tests); Grace Panetta, 
There’s a New Downloadable Font Inspired by Gerrymandered Congressional Districts, BUS. 
INSIDER (Aug. 1, 2019, 1:25 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/you-can-download-font-
gerrymandered-congressional-districts-2019-8/ (providing a moderately legible typeface 
constructed entirely of congressional districts). 
 8.  See Danny Hayes & Seth C. McKee, The Participatory Effects of Redistricting, 53 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 1006, 1008–09 (2009) (reviewing effects on turnout and incumbency costs); Fred Dews, 
A Primer on Gerrymandering and Political Polarization, BROOKINGS INST. (July 6, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/07/06/a-primer-on-gerrymandering-and-
political-polarization/ (discussing polarization and ideological segregation); Sam Fleming, Battle 
Lines: The Fight for a Fair Vote in America, FT MAG (Aug. 2, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/gerrymandering (highlighting widespread voter frustration and electoral 
futility); Thomas E. Mann, We Must Address Gerrymandering, TIME (Oct. 13, 2016), 
https://time.com/4527291/2016-election-gerrymandering/ (observing “hyper-partisanship that 
paralyzes our politics and governance”). 
 9.  Redistricting Commissions: Congressional Plans, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 
18, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-commissions-congressional-
plans.aspx.  Eight states have delegated redistricting authority to an independent commission, while 
eight others have a commission that works alongside the legislature.  Id.  Iowa follows a unique 
system that leaves the task up to nonpartisan legislative staff, with a final legislative vote of 
approval.  Id.  
 10.  139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
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beyond the authority of the federal courts.11  The Court reached this 
conclusion despite a longstanding acknowledgement that extreme 
gerrymandering is “incompatible with [our] democratic principles”12—over 
the years, assorted Justices from both parties have criticized gerrymandering 
as everything from “cherry-pick[ing] voters,”13 to “rigging elections,”14 to a 
subversion of “the core principle of republican government . . . that the voters 
should choose their representatives, not the other way around.”15  With the 
doors of the federal courts closed, voters seeking to challenge their political 
disempowerment will be left to seek relief from the state courts, or from the 
gerrymanderers themselves.16 
This result may have been predictable, but it was also avoidable.  From 
the outset, the development of gerrymandering doctrine was hindered by the 
Court’s decision to accept partisan dominance as a permissible motive, and 
to frame its analysis around the impact of a map on future elections.17  
Instead, the Court should have drawn the line at intent.  This Note challenges 
the Court’s insistence on an effects-based jurisprudence by arguing that a 
map drawn with the predominant purpose of securing partisan advantage is a 
form of viewpoint discrimination and a violation of the political participatory 
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.18  Properly adjudicated under a 
manageable standard grounded in intent, extreme partisan gerrymanders like 
those in Maryland and North Carolina are a clear constitutional violation, and 
cannot be a political question.19 
                                                          
 11.  See infra Part III. 
 12.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)). 
 13.  Id. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 14.  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 15.  Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2677 (quoting Mitchell N. Berman, Managing 
Gerrymandering, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 781, 781 (2005)).  
 16.  See Gretchen Frazee & Laura Santhanam, What the Supreme Court’s Gerrymandering 
Decision Means for 2020, PBS (June 28, 2019, 5:51 PM), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/what-the-supreme-courts-gerrymandering-decision-means-
for-2020 (discussing how redistricting has become a focal point in “state-level fights for political 
power” following the 2010 election); Michael Wines, State Court Bars Using North Carolina House 
Map in 2020 Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/us/north-carolina-gerrymander-maps.html (revealing how a 
North Carolina Superior Court struck down the map at issue in Rucho under a state constitutional 
provision). 
 17.  See infra Part II.B. 
 18.  See infra Part IV. 
 19.  See infra Part IV.D. 
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I.  THE CASE 
Rucho v. Common Cause featured parallel challenges to congressional 
district maps drawn by the Maryland and North Carolina legislatures.20  Each 
map was designed to consolidate the congressional advantage of each state’s 
majority party: In Maryland, the map favored Democrats, while in North 
Carolina, the map favored Republicans.21  Each map performed exactly as 
intended, reinforcing each party’s control over its state’s congressional 
delegation in subsequent elections.22  In response, voters and public interest 
organizations challenged each map under the First Amendment, the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Elections Clause, and 
Article I, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.23  In both cases, the plaintiffs 
prevailed, the maps were enjoined, and the defendants appealed.24 
Common Cause v. Rucho25 featured a challenge to North Carolina’s 
2016 Congressional Redistricting Plan (the “2016 Plan”).26  After two 
elections in which Republicans secured at least seventy-five percent of the 
state’s Congressional seats despite earning at most fifty-five percent of the 
popular vote,27 North Carolina Representative David Lewis and Senator 
Robert Rucho, co-chairs of the Assembly’s redistricting committee, hired a 
Republican specialist to draw a map that would maintain the Republican 
Party’s 10-3 advantage in the state’s Congressional delegation.28  This 
process was openly partisan: The redistricting committee listed “Partisan 
Advantage” as a guiding criterion in the map-drawing process.29  
Representative Lewis “acknowledge[d] freely that this would be a political 
gerrymander,” and optimized the map for a 10-3 Republican advantage only 
“because he did not believe it [would be] possible to draw a map with 11 
Republicans and 2 Democrats.”30  Adopted on party lines, the map solidified 
                                                          
 20.  Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019). 
 21.  Id. at 2491, 2493. 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id. at 2491.  Article I Section 2 provides that representatives “shall be apportioned among 
the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  318 F. Supp. 3d 777 (M.D.N.C. 2018), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 26.  Id. at 799. 
 27.  Id. at 804.  
 28.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2510 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  The specialist, Dr. Thomas Hofeller, 
employed “sophisticated technological tools and precinct-level election results . . . to predict voting 
behavior.”  Id.   
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 808 (alterations in original).  Representative Lewis 
further proclaimed, “I think electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats.  So I drew this 
map to help foster what I think is better for the country.”  Id. at 809. 
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the Republican Party’s advantage in 2016 and 2018, despite a dwindling 
popular vote lead.31 
Benisek v. Lamone32 presented the same issue along inverted party 
lines.33  In 2011, Maryland Democrats aggressively pursued a redistricting 
plan that would create a 7-1 advantage in Congress, despite the party’s 
election share peaking at sixty-five percent.34  Maryland Senate President 
Thomas V. Mike Miller, Jr., characterized this gerrymander as a “serious 
obligation” to counteract the Republican Party’s nationwide redistricting 
efforts.35  According to former Governor Martin O’Malley, the map was 
calibrated to flip the Sixth Congressional District into Democratic control.36  
The Democrat-led redistricting committee hired Eric Hawkins, an analyst at 
a Democratic consulting firm, “to ensure that the new map produced 7 
reliable Democratic seats, and to protect all Democratic incumbents.”37  To 
achieve this goal, Hawkins moved approximately 360,000 voters out of the 
district, and moved 350,000 new voters in—reducing the population of 
registered Republicans by over 66,000 while increasing the number of 
Democrats by 24,000.38  Following this map’s adoption—also on party 
lines—the Sixth District has remained firmly Democratic.39 
The United States District Courts for the District of Maryland and the 
Middle District of North Carolina primarily adjudicated these claims under 
the First Amendment.40  Each court synthesized the Supreme Court’s 
viewpoint discrimination precedent41 to distill roughly equivalent three-
prong tests, requiring: (1) an invidious intent to discriminate against the 
disfavored party, (2) a discriminatory impact on that party, and (3) a causal 
                                                          
 31.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2510 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 32.  348 F. Supp. 3d 493 (D. Md. 2018), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 33.  Id. at 497. 
 34.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2511 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 35.  Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 506.  
 36.  Id. at 502. 
 37.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2511 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 38.  Id. at 2493 (majority opinion).   
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 2492–93.  The Common Cause Court also ruled on Equal Protection grounds.  Id. at 
2492.  Under the Common Cause Equal Protection test, plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) “that a 
legislative mapdrawer’s predominant purpose . . . was to ‘subordinate adherents of one political 
party and entrench a rival party in power’”; and (2) “that the dilution of the votes of supporters of a 
disfavored party . . . is likely to persist in subsequent elections such that an elected representative 
from the favored party in the district will not feel a need to be responsive to constituents who support 
the disfavored party.”  Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 864, 867 (M.D.N.C. 2018) 
(quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 
(2015)), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 41.  See infra Section II.A.3. 
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connection between intent and effect.42  Through this analysis, a map’s 
discriminatory impact could be expressed either as an injury to the plaintiff’s 
representational rights on a theory of vote dilution, or an associational injury 
by virtue of a chilling effect on the political activities of the disfavored 
party.43 
Applying this test to an extensive array of direct44 and circumstantial45 
evidence, both courts ruled for the plaintiffs and enjoined the challenged 
district maps.46  The courts found that the plaintiffs had successfully stated a 
representational injury by demonstrating that their natural political strength 
was diluted through the “widespread cracking and packing”47 of their party’s 
votes.48  The Benisek court held that the Maryland plaintiffs had also suffered 
an associational injury, as residents of the Sixth District “were burdened in 
fundraising, attracting volunteers, campaigning, and generating interest in 
voting in an atmosphere of general confusion and apathy.”49  Both sets of 
defendants appealed directly to the Supreme Court under Title 28, section 
1253 of the United States Code.50 
                                                          
 42.  Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 515 (D. Md. 2018), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 
(2019); Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 929.   
 43.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2502–03; Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 517, 522; Common Cause, 318 
F. Supp. 3d at 840, 858.  
 44.  Among other evidence, the plaintiffs in Common Cause and Benisek demonstrated 
legislative intent by pointing to clear statements by legislators and party officials involved with the 
redistricting process.  Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 803; Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 502, 
506.  Each party made efforts to limit the minority’s involvement in the mapmaking process and 
engaged in private talks with partisan consultants.; Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 803; Benisek, 
348 F. Supp. 3d at 502, 504–05.  Testimony demonstrated that these consultants relied heavily on 
voter data and were instructed to draw a partisan map.  Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 803; 
Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 502–03. 
 45.  Each case relied on different forms of circumstantial evidence to demonstrate the 
challenged maps’ extreme partisan lean.  See Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 500–01, 507 (noting 
historic swing in the Sixth District’s “Partisan Voter Index” and reshuffling of voters); Common 
Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 896–97 (comparing North Carolina map to thousands of hypothetical 
alternatives generated by plaintiffs’ expert, nonprofit organizations, and a bipartisan panel of 
judges). 
 46.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491. 
 47.  Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 884.  Cracking involves spreading members of a 
disfavored group across multiple districts to dilute their voting strength; packing entails 
concentrating members of that group into a limited number of districts to minimize the effect of 
individual votes.  Id. at 811. 
 48.  Id. at 884. 
 49.  Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 524. 
 50.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491.  Under Title 28, section 2284(a) of the United States Code, “[a] 
district court of three judges shall be convened . . . when an action is filed challenging the 
constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2012).  A 
losing party may appeal the grant of an injunction issued by a three-judge panel directly to the 
Supreme Court.  Id. § 1253. 
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II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Rucho v. Common Cause was the 
culmination of a decades-long struggle to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering 
claims.51  Understanding the heart of that quagmire and the basis of the Rucho 
opinion requires a broad look at the Court’s interpretation of its power of 
review.  Section II.A explores the way separation of powers limits the scope 
of judicial authority.52  Section II.B discusses how these principles have been 
applied to shape the Court’s redistricting jurisprudence.53 
A.  Justiciability and the Scope of Judicial Review 
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases or controversies arising under the 
laws of the United States.54  Cognizant of the counter-majoritarian concerns 
associated with overreach by an unelected judiciary, the Supreme Court has 
construed this language to constrain the realm of disputes within the scope of 
judicial review.55  Justiciability doctrines such as ripeness, standing, and 
mootness function as procedural and temporal limitations on the judicial 
role.56  Comparatively, nonjusticiable political questions are substantive 
matters entirely beyond the authority of the federal courts, often by virtue of 
their commitment to a coordinate branch of government.57 
These doctrines—political question among them—are characterized by 
a continuing tension between judicial respect for the political process and the 
judicial role as a check on democratic decisionmaking.58  Section II.A.1 
discusses how the political question doctrine has been used to balance these 
competing concepts as an implementation of the separation of powers.59  
Section II.A.2 reviews how these same conceptual foundations undergird a 
rubric for heightened scrutiny of laws that harm the majoritarian democratic 
process.60  Section II.A.3 provides a proof of concept for this framework by 
                                                          
 51.  See infra Section II.B.2. 
 52.  See infra Section II.A. 
 53.  See infra Section II.B. 
 54.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 55.  See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1968) (finding the words “case” and “controversy” 
“limit the business of federal courts to questions . . . capable of resolution through the judicial 
process” and “define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power”). 
 56.  Id. at 95. 
 57.  Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454–55 (1939) (referencing “the appropriateness under 
our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also 
the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination” as “dominant considerations” in the 
justiciability of a substantive legal issue). 
 58.  See id. 
 59.  See infra Section II.A.1 
 60.  See infra Section II.A.2. 
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illustrating the Court’s history of intervention to restrain legislative and 
executive decisions with a deleterious impact on state elections.61 
1.  The Separation of Powers: Origin and Application of the Political 
Question Doctrine 
The political question doctrine constrains the power of judicial review 
by protecting the policymaking prerogative of the democratically elected 
branches.62  The notion that some policy decisions are not suitable for judicial 
redress can be traced back to the earliest decisions of the Supreme Court.63  
In Marbury v. Madison,64 Justice Marshall recognized that the discretionary 
exercise of executive power is not subject to judicial oversight.65  
Comparatively, a President’s ministerial duty to comply with a statutory or 
constitutional mandate may be subject to review.66  Additionally, the Court 
has traditionally held that the Constitution’s guaranty of “a Republican Form 
of Government”67 is the exclusive province of the political branches.68  Any 
judicial evaluation of the legitimacy of a state government would necessarily 
require subjective policy determinations by unelected judges, with sweeping 
implications for the allocation of a state’s political power.69  
The modern formulation of this doctrine emerged in Baker v. Carr,70 
when the Supreme Court evaluated the justiciability of an Equal Protection 
                                                          
 61.  See infra Section II.A.3. 
 62.  See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) 
(characterizing the political question doctrine as excluding from review “policy choices and value 
determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of 
the Executive Branch”). 
 63.  E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803); Hylton v. United States, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 173–75 (1796). 
 64.  5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 65.  Id. at 165–66 (“By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with 
certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is 
accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience. . . . [W]hatever 
opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there 
exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion.”). 
 66.  Id at 166. (“[W]hen the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties . . . he is 
so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion 
sport away the vested rights of others.”). 
 67.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government.”). 
 68.  Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). 
 69.  Id. at 41–42 (finding “it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established 
one in a State”; noting “[I]ts decision is binding on every other department of the government, and 
could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal”; and questioning the standard by which a court could 
evaluate this decision). 
 70.  369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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challenge to Tennessee’s legislative district plan.71  The Baker Court first 
evaluated traditionally nonreviewable powers, including foreign relations,72 
recognition of foreign and tribal governments,73 the duration of wartime 
hostilities,74 and the validity of constitutional amendments.75  Synthesizing 
these concepts, and finding the case justiciable, the Court reasoned that “[t]he 
nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the 
separation of powers.”76  Prominent among political questions are several 
features, including “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate political department,” and “a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”77  When a case is 
characterized by one or more of these patterns, judicial intervention would 
likely implicate separation of powers, and the Court should decline to 
exercise its power of review.78 
Nevertheless, the presence of a political question turns on the unique 
circumstances of each case.79  As “deference rests on reason, not habit,” the 
Court will intervene if the facts clearly demonstrate that a government actor 
has exceeded the scope of its authority.80  The Court has declined to review 
matters of impeachment, a power granted exclusively to the Senate,81 and 
prudentially refrained from interfering with the organization of the National 
                                                          
 71.  Id. at 187, 196, 197–98.  The Baker plaintiffs alleged that Tennessee’s continued use of an 
apportionment plan adopted in 1901 was “unconstitutional and obsolete,” as the state’s population 
had grown and shifted dramatically in the half century since that plan was enacted.  Id. at 192–94. 
 72.  Id. at 211. 
 73.  Id. at 212, 215. 
 74.  Id. at 213. 
 75.  Id. at 214. 
 76.  Id. at 210. 
 77.  Id. at 217.  The full list of political question formulations provided in Baker also includes:  
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; 
or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or 
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question. 
Id.   
 78.  Cf. id. at 217 (“Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there 
should be no dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground of a political question’s presence.”). 
 79.  Id. at 210–11 (noting that “the ‘political question’ label” tends to incorrectly suggest a 
categorical analysis and “obscure the need for case-by-case inquiry”). 
 80.  Id. at 213–14; accord Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547 (1924) (“[A] Court 
is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law depends upon 
the truth of what is declared.”).  
 81.  Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229 (1993) (holding that where Article I, section 3, 
grants the Senate “the sole Power to try all Impeachments,” the word “sole” suggests the Senate’s 
authority is exclusive). 
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Guard, a responsibility vested in Congress.82  In each case, the lack of 
manageable standards suggested that the constitutional commitment in 
question was intended to be exclusive, as the issue was not suitable for 
judicial resolution.83  By contrast, in Powell v. McCormack,84 the Supreme 
Court determined that the House of Representatives cannot exclude lawfully 
elected members, notwithstanding its constitutional authority to determine 
their qualifications under Article I, Section 5.85  In light “of the basic 
principles of our Democratic system,” the Court reasoned that the “textually 
demonstrable commitment” of authority embodied by that provision does not 
include “a discretionary power to deny membership by a majority vote.”86 
2.  The Famous Footnote Four: A Rubric for Heightened Review of 
Legislative Actions 
The same principles of judicial restraint that animate the political 
question doctrine also demand that decisions of the legislature are given 
substantial deference by the courts.87  Even before Marbury, the Court has 
frequently attached a presumption of constitutionality to legislative acts.88  
When invoking this presumption, the Court construes every possible 
inference in favor of a law’s validity and will only intervene where an alleged 
constitutional violation is readily apparent.89  In modern jurisprudence, this 
concept has been formalized as the rational basis standard of review—a 
                                                          
 82.  Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1973) (noting that where Article I, section 8, grants 
Congress and the States the power to organize and discipline the militia, judicial review “would 
therefore embrace critical areas of responsibility vested by the Constitution in the Legislative and 
Executive Branches of the Government”). 
 83.  Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–29 (finding the two concepts are not distinct, as “the lack of 
judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable 
commitment to a coordinate branch”); Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 8 (doubting the “technical competence” 
of a judge to engage in the technical evaluation required to review regulations of the armed forces).  
 84.  395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
 85.  Id. at 548.  
 86.  Id.  
 87.  See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (“When Congress acts within 
its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed 
judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution.”). 
 88.  E.g., Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 18 (1800) (“The presumption, indeed, must 
always be in favor of the validity of laws, if the contrary is not clearly demonstrated.”); Hylton v. 
United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 175 (1796) (declining to overturn tax on carriages absent clear 
evidence; holding that acts of Congress should only be overturned as unconstitutional “in a very 
clear case”). 
 89.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Due respect for the decisions of a 
coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon 
a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.”); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 625 (1819) (“[T]his court has expressed the cautious 
circumspection with which it approaches the consideration of such questions; . . . in no doubtful 
case, would it pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution.”). 
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highly deferential analysis characterized by respect for the policymaking 
prerogative of the elected legislature.90  Rational basis scrutiny operates as a 
judicial default, and is applied unless challenged legislation implicates a 
fundamental right or a suspect classification.91 
This deference—and its underlying principles of restraint—is set aside 
whenever legislative decisions implicate constitutional guaranties.92  The 
most famous statement of this principle comes from United States v. 
Carolene Products, Co.,93 a commerce clause case featuring a congressional 
prohibition on the interstate shipment of filled milk.94  In a well-cited 
footnote of that decision (“Footnote Four”), the Court articulated a 
framework for a more exacting standard of judicial review.95  Although not 
exhaustive, the Court provided three predicate circumstances for heightened 
scrutiny: (1) laws that appear to violate specific constitutional provisions, 
such as Bill of Rights guaranties; (2) restrictions on the majoritarian political 
process, such as limitations on the right to vote, the dissemination of 
information, or the operation of political organizations; and (3) 
discrimination “against discrete and insular minorities”—groups lacking the 
ability to defend their interests through the organic operations of the political 
process.96 
The principles set forth by Footnote Four have evolved into a framework 
for the judicial role, defining when intervention should prevail over restraint 
and prudential considerations.  In the decades following Carolene Products, 
the Court has applied strict scrutiny to strike down laws that discriminate 
against suspect classes or interfere with fundamental rights.97  Similarly, the 
Court has gradually articulated various degrees of heightened scrutiny to 
safeguard the liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights.98  Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
 90.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[L]egislation . . . is not 
to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed 
it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within 
the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”); accord Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 
348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (“[T]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its 
aims to be constitutional.  It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might 
be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”). 
 91.  Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 
184, 191–92 (1964). 
 92.  Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 93.  304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 94.  Id. at 145–46. 
 95.  Id. at 152 n.4. 
 96.  Id.  
 97.  See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 216 (1944), for the earliest articulations of strict scrutiny to evaluate laws that interfere 
with fundamental rights or engage in suspect classifications.  
 98.  See, for example, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638–
39 (1943), for an early description of the principles of heightened scrutiny for those Bill of Rights 
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theory of heightened scrutiny to protect the political process has not been 
entirely ignored:99 Echoes of the Footnote’s majoritarian concerns are visible 
in the emergence of the fundamental right to vote, and the Court’s embrace 
of an active judicial role in moderating election law issues.100 
3. Election Law Jurisprudence: Protecting the Rights of Suffrage and 
Political Participation 
Article 1, Section 4 of the United States Constitution (the “Elections 
Clause”) grants state legislatures authority over the time, place, and manner 
of congressional elections, subject to congressional oversight.101  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that the right to vote and to 
participate in the political process is a fundamental tenant of representative 
government.102  This principle has been increasingly expressed in terms of 
the First Amendment freedoms of association, representation, and 
expression—political participatory rights inseparable from the freedom of 
speech,103 and fundamental to the foundations of our democracy.104  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has applied varying degrees of heightened 
scrutiny when a state uses this power to restrict or hinder individual 
participation in the political process.105   
The Court’s ballot access doctrine is a keen example of this category of 
judicial review.  The Court first recognized a fundamental right to vote under 
                                                          
provisions incorporated as fundamental, rejecting application of the rational basis test for laws that 
address freedom of the press or religion. 
 99.  See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969) (finding the 
presumption of constitutionality inoperative where state governments have deviated from their 
majoritarian mandate). 
 100.  See infra Section II.A.3. 
 101.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 102.  See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000) (finding representative 
democracy “unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band together [to support] . . . candidates 
who espouse their political views”); Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 
173, 184 (1979) (emphasizing that “voting is of the most fundamental significance under our 
constitutional structure”).  
 103.  Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (“[P]olitical belief and association constitute the 
core of those activities protected by the First Amendment.”); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 
460 (1958) (“[F]reedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an 
inseparable aspect of . . . freedom of speech.”).  
 104.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“Speech is an 
essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.”); 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (affirming that the First Amendment, as a 
fundamental tenant of American government, reflects a “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”). 
 105.  E.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969) (overturning 
restriction on participation in school board elections); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 
666 (1966) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down poll tax as unconstitutional). 
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the Equal Protection Clause in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,106 
characterizing the franchise as “preservative of other basic civil and political 
rights.”107  Since Harper, the Court has consistently applied strict scrutiny to 
overturn ballot access restrictions108 or laws that limit participation in party 
primary elections.109  Comparatively, evenhanded election regulations are 
measured through a balancing test articulated in Anderson v. Celebrezze,110 
considering: (1) “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the 
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments,” (2) “the precise 
interests put forward by the State,” and (3) “the extent to which those interests 
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”111  These laws are often 
upheld if the burden imposed is justified by the state’s compelling interest in 
preserving the integrity of the election process—and overturned where they 
effect an exclusion of candidates or voters from public participation.112   
The same First Amendment principles that preclude ballot access 
restrictions also dictate heightened scrutiny of laws that discriminate on the 
basis of political belief.113  Government acts that “disfavor certain subjects 
or viewpoints” or “identif[y] certain preferred speakers” are heavily 
                                                          
 106.  383 U.S. 663 (1966).  
 107.  Id. at 667 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964)); see also Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (declaring the franchise “a fundamental political right, because 
preservative of all rights”). 
 108.  E.g., Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 186–87 (1979) 
(applying strict scrutiny to overturn requirement that candidates obtain 25,000 signatures); Harper 
v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (applying heightened scrutiny to strike down poll 
tax law).  
 109.  Political primaries have come to be recognized as “an integral part of the election 
machinery,” and are afforded similar protections to general elections.  See United States v. Classic, 
313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941).  For example, in the now-infamous “White Primary” cases, the Court 
used the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to strike down laws creating race-based restrictions 
on Texas Democratic Party primaries.  See generally Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith 
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 
U.S. 536 (1927). 
 110.  460 U.S. 780 (1983).  
 111.  Id. at 789; see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1968) (finding the First 
Amendment protects “the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, 
and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes 
effectively”). 
 112.  Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n. 9.  Compare Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 
181, 191, 204 (2008) (upholding Indiana voter ID requirement based on state’s interest in preventing 
voter fraud), with Williams, 393 U.S. at 25 (overturning election law that made it “virtually 
impossible” for a new political party to be placed on the ballot). 
 113.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“[T]he First 
Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints”); Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“The government must abstain from 
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker 
is the rationale for the restriction.”); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976) (“The cost of the 
practice of patronage is the restraint it places on freedoms of belief and association.”).  
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disfavored,114 as political speech “is an essential mechanism of democracy” 
and “a precondition to enlightened self-government.”115  These concerns are 
manifest in the political arena, where First Amendment freedoms are “at their 
zenith.”116  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has overturned regulations that 
limit individual campaign contributions,117 constrain a party’s freedom over 
its organizational structure,118 or frustrate the effectiveness of political 
speech.119  Similarly, the Court has held that any invidious consideration of 
partisan loyalty in government patronage decisions amounts to “coerced 
belief,” and a violation of the freedom of association.120  These rulings have 
been justified by a need to preserve “[t]he free functioning of the electoral 
process,” and to avoid conflating the priorities of a political party with the 
interests of the government itself.121 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Redistricting Jurisprudence 
The Elections Clause grants state legislatures the authority to regulate 
federal elections, and commits oversight of this process to Congress.122  
Throughout the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court interpreted this 
language to hold that redistricting challenges are nonjusticiable, reasoning 
that the States have exclusive discretion over the distribution of electoral 
power between their political subdivisions.123  Justice Frankfurter, writing for 
the majority in Colegrove v. Green,124 famously described the apportionment 
                                                          
 114.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. 
 115.  Id. at 339.  
 116.  Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988); accord Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. 
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (noting that the First Amendment “‘has its fullest and most urgent 
application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office’” (internal citation omitted)). 
 117.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319 (overturning corporate campaign finance limits).  
 118.  E.g., Eu, 489 U.S. at 222, 229 (finding restrictions on party organization and internal 
processes “directly implicate the associational rights of political parties and their members”). 
 119.  E.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 489–90 (2014) (finding it “no answer to say that 
[anti-abortion protesters] can still be seen and heard” when government-imposed buffer zones “have 
effectively stifled [their] message”); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 736, 738 (2008) 
(holding that an election law supporting underfunded opponents of well-financed candidates 
“impermissibly burdens [a well-financed candidate’s] First Amendment right to spend his own 
money for campaign speech”). 
 120.  Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355–56 (1976).   
 121.  Id. at 355–56, 362. 
 122.  See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 123.  See South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950) (declining to involve the judiciary in 
“political issues arising from a state’s geographical distribution of electoral strength”); MacDougall 
v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 284 (1948) (finding states have the prerogative to “assure a proper diffusion 
of political initiative” among their political subdivisions); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 
(1946) (finding “the Constitution has conferred upon Congress exclusive authority to secure fair 
representation by the States” and therefore “precludes judicial correction”). 
 124.  328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
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process as a “political thicket” beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts.125  
This attitude changed following Baker, when the Court held that none of the 
formulations of a political question are present in a redistricting suit.126  In 
the subsequent decades, the Court began to develop principles under the 
Equal Protection Clause to evaluate the fairness of district maps.127  Section 
II.B.1 explores the evolution of judicially manageable standards for cases 
involving malapportionment and racial gerrymandering.128  Section II.B.2 
reviews the Court’s struggle to develop a corresponding framework for 
partisan gerrymandering claims.129 
1.  Equal Protection Standards: Equal Population and Racial 
Gerrymandering 
Following Baker, the Supreme Court has developed two clear standards 
for evaluating Congressional districts under the Fourteenth Amendment.130  
First, as a constitutional minimum, equal population—or “one person, one 
vote”—must be the legislature’s controlling consideration in the redistricting 
process.131  Although mathematical precision is neither expected nor 
required, departures from equal population must be justified by “legitimate 
considerations incident to . . . a rational state policy”—such as respect for 
established municipal boundaries, the preservation of existing districts, or 
principles of compactness and contiguity.132  Even minimal deviations, 
unless unavoidable, require justification,133 and substantial differences in 
population may raise a presumption that a map was drawn with 
unconstitutional motives.134  
                                                          
 125.  Id. at 556. 
 126.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962); see also supra Section II.A.3. 
 127.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557 (1964) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause provides 
discoverable and manageable standards for use by lower courts in determining the constitutionality 
of a state legislative apportionment scheme . . . .”). 
 128.  See infra Section II.B.1. 
 129.  See infra Section II.B.2. 
 130.  See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993) (“[Redistricting] schemes violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect 
of diluting minority voting strength.”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (“[A]s nearly 
as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”). 
 131.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558, 581; Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 
1257, 1270–71 (2015) (emphasizing the constitutional nature of this requirement; calling equal 
population “a background rule against which redistricting takes place”).   
 132.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577, 578–81.  
 133.  White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 
(1969) (finding “the command of Art. I, § 2 . . . permits only the limited population variances which 
are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is 
shown”).   
 134.  Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973) (noting “population deviations among 
districts may be sufficiently large to require justification”). 
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This requirement, now a bedrock principle of the redistricting process, 
is grounded in the right to vote.135  In Wesberry v. Sanders136 and Reynolds 
v. Sims,137 the Court held Article I, Section 2,138 construed in light of the 
structural design of the bicameral legislature, demands “equal representation 
in the House for equal numbers of people.”139  Districts drawn without equal 
population violate this guarantee by distorting the proportionate influence of 
each voter.140  This differential weighing of votes based on geographical 
location amounts to a form of discrimination that offends the basic mandate 
of Equal Protection.141  Notably, Justice Harlan dissented from each of these 
decisions on political question grounds, arguing that the Elections Clause 
grants Congress exclusive oversight of the apportionment process.142  
Rejecting Justice Harlan’s proposition, the Court held that Congress cannot 
insulate a constitutional injury from review.143   
Second, the Court has categorically precluded the invidious 
consideration of race in the redistricting process.144  Although a legislature 
engaged in redistricting will inevitably be aware of racial demographics,145 a 
congressional map will be subject to strict scrutiny if racial considerations 
were the “overriding, predominant force”—the “dominant and controlling 
rationale”—in the apportionment process.146  Although compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act and remedial classifications to correct past racial 
                                                          
 135.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561–62 (“[S]ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and 
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement 
of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”); see also supra 
notes 106–109 and accompanying text. 
 136.  376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 137.  377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 138.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (mandating representatives be chosen “by the People of the several 
States . . . according to their respective Numbers”). 
 139.  Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 14. 
 140.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 563. 
 141.  Id.  
 142.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing “[t]hese decisions . . . have the 
effect of placing basic aspects of state political systems under the pervasive overlordship of the 
federal judiciary”); Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 23 (Harlan, J., dissenting); cf. supra note 101 and 
accompanying text. 
 143.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 582, 585 (“[O]nce a State’s legislative apportionment scheme has 
been found to be unconstitutional, it would be the unusual case in which a court would be justified 
in not taking appropriate action . . . .”).  
 144.  Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911, 915 (1995). 
 145.  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) (“[R]edistricting differs from other kinds of state 
decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines. . . . That 
sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination.”). 
 146.  Miller, 515 U.S. at 909, 913, 916 (citation omitted) (finding racial gerrymander where “the 
legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . to racial considerations”). 
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gerrymanders may allow a race-conscious map to survive strict scrutiny,147 
courts repeatedly strike down districts designed to dilute the representation 
of a racial group.148  Consistent with standard equal protection jurisprudence, 
facially neutral districts that are “unexplainable on grounds other than 
race”—such as those with extraordinarily bizarre shapes—raise a 
presumption of improper motive.149  
The difficulty of ascertaining predominant intent has been a consistent 
barrier to redress, especially when the mapmakers indicate a mixed or 
alternative motive.150  This problem is best illustrated by the line of cases 
addressing North Carolina’s Twelfth Congressional District.151  In Shaw v. 
Reno (“Shaw I”)152 and Shaw v. Hunt (“Shaw II”),153 the first two decisions 
addressing this issue, the Court struck down the district as an unconstitutional 
racial gerrymander.154  The Court found that the district’s irregular shape, 
juxtaposed against its history and demographics, supported a conclusion that 
the map was deliberately drawn to create “two majority-black districts.”155  
When the map was redrawn and subsequently challenged, the plaintiffs were 
unable to establish predominant intent, as the new map corresponded evenly 
with racial and partisan considerations.156  Nevertheless, the Court has been 
careful to avoid conflating race and party: Although the predominant intent 
to obtain partisan advantage provides a shield against racial gerrymandering 
                                                          
 147.  See North Carolina v. Covington, 138 S. Ct. 2548, 2554 (2018) (upholding adoption of 
special master’s “expressly race-conscious” redistricting plan that was “limited to ensuring that the 
plaintiffs were relieved of the burden of voting in racially gerrymandered legislative districts”); 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986) (finding majority-minority districts must be 
maintained under the Voting Rights Act if (1) the minority group is “sufficiently large and 
geographically compact to constitute a majority;” (2) the minority group is “politically cohesive;” 
and (3) the majority “votes sufficiently as a bloc . . . to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate”). 
 148.  Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642. 
 149.  Id. at 643, 649; e.g., Goumillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960) (enjoining a 
redistricting law converting square-shaped district into “an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure”). 
 150.  See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257–58 (2001) (discussing the burden placed on 
plaintiffs to demonstrate predominant intent). 
 151.  See generally Easley, 532 U.S. 234 (involving a decade of continuous litigation over 
whether the Twelfth District is a racial gerrymander in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Shaw, 509 U.S. 630.  
 152.  509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 153.  517 U.S. 899 (1996). 
 154.  Id. at 906 (reaching this conclusion under Miller). 
 155.  Id. at 905–906. 
 156.  Easley, 532 U.S. at 258 (finding plaintiffs failed to show “that the legislature could have 
achieved its legitimate political objectives in alternate ways that are comparably consistent with 
traditional districting principles”); Hunt, 526 U.S. at 549–51 (reviewing expert’s testimony “that 
the data as a whole supported a political explanation at least as well as, and somewhat better than, 
a racial explanation”). 
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claims, use of racial demographics as a proxy for partisan alignment remains 
impermissible.157 
2.  Partisan Gerrymandering in the Supreme Court: Struggle to 
Develop a Standard 
Despite the emergence of coherent standards for race and population, 
the Supreme Court has struggled to articulate a consistent approach to 
partisan gerrymandering.158  In Gaffney v. Cummings,159 decided eleven years 
after Baker, the Court rejected a challenge to a redistricting plan drafted to 
promote proportional representation for the two major parties.160  Reasoning 
that “districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political 
consequences,” the Court concluded that the legislature’s consideration of 
partisan interests is a necessary incident of the apportionment process.161  
Moreover, the Court found no authority to overturn a plan that “undertakes, 
not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but 
to . . . provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the legislative 
halls of the State.”162 
Although the Gaffney Court was arguably advancing a benign 
classification theory for redistricting,163 subsequent decisions citing Gaffney 
have embellished on this principle, culminating in the proposition that “a 
jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering.”164  
Accordingly, the challenge lies in determining how much partisan impact 
may be tolerated—and defining the boundary between permissible partisan 
advantage and unconstitutional partisan entrenchment.165 
                                                          
 157.  Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 968 (1996). 
 158.  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 282, 306 (2004) (describing “[e]ighteen years of 
essentially pointless litigation” and the “long record of puzzlement and consternation” faced by 
federal courts resolving these claims). 
 159.  412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
 160.  Id. at 738 (“[State] Senate and House districts were structured so that the composition of 
both Houses would reflect ‘as closely as possible . . . the actual [statewide] plurality . . . in a given 
election.’” (second and third alterations in original)). 
 161.  Id. at 752–53. 
 162.  Id. at 754. 
 163.  See id. (“[J]udicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports fairly to 
allocate political power to the parties in accordance with their voting strength . . . .”); accord Vieth, 
541 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“A determination that a gerrymander violates the law 
must rest on something more than the conclusion that political classifications were applied.  It must 
rest instead on a conclusion that the classifications, though generally permissible, were applied in 
an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective.”). 
 164.  Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999).  
 165.  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (“[A]n equal protection violation may be 
found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity 
to influence the political process effectively.”); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306–07 (2004) (Kennedy, 
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The Court’s first crack at this problem came in Davis v. Bandemer,166 
featuring a challenge to the district map adopted by Indiana following the 
1980 census.167  The plan, developed with negligible input from Democrats, 
granted Republicans fifty-seven percent of legislative seats with only forty-
eight percent of the popular vote.168  Addressing these disparities, the Court 
affirmed the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims, finding the 
underlying constitutional question comparable to racial gerrymandering as a 
dilution of the voting strength of a target demographic.169  Nevertheless, 
harkening to Gaffney’s recognition that political considerations are an 
inevitable feature of the districting process,170 the Court held that an electoral 
disadvantage does not necessarily invalidate a constitutional map.171  Rather, 
“unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is 
arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of 
voters’ influence on the political process as a whole.”172  
This “consistent degradation” test proved exceedingly difficult to 
satisfy, and in Vieth v. Jubelirer,173 the Justices repudiated Bandemer and 
fractured over the proper standard to apply.174  Vieth involved a Pennsylvania 
map enacted as “a punitive measure” in response to Democratic redistricting 
efforts in other states—and calibrated to ensure Republicans received thirteen 
of nineteen congressional seats, with only 49.9% of the popular vote.175  
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion drew a stark contrast between race, “a rare 
and constitutionally suspect motive,” and partisan advantage, “an ordinary 
and lawful motive,” to distinguish the two claims.176  Echoing Justice 
Harlan’s dissents in Reynolds and Wesberry, Justice Scalia emphasized that 
                                                          
J., concurring) (identifying as core obstacles “the lack of comprehensive and neutral principles for 
drawing electoral boundaries” and “the absence of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention”). 
 166.  478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 167.  Id. at 113. 
 168.  Id. at 115; see Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1495 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (noting “[t]he 
minority party was wholly excluded from the mapmaking process”), rev’d, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 169.  Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 124–25 (observing that either claim involves an “identifiable racial 
or ethnic group [claiming] an insufficient chance to elect a representative of its choice;” reasoning 
“that the claim is submitted by a political group, rather than a racial group, does not distinguish it 
in terms of justiciability”).  
 170.  See supra notes 161–164 and accompanying text. 
 171.  Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 128–29, 131–32. 
 172.  Id. at 132.  The Bandemer Court reasoned such discrimination may occur either as a result 
of “continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of 
voters of a fair chance to influence the political process.”  Id. at 133. 
 173.  541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 174.  Id. at 282–84. 
 175.  Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535–36 (M.D. Pa. 2002), aff’d, 541 U.S. 267 
(2004).  This plan did not live up to its partisan expectations—in subsequent elections, the map 
produced only a narrow 11–10 advantage for Republicans.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 289.  
 176.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286. 
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political gerrymandering was a common practice during colonial times, and 
construed the Elections Clause as precluding judicial intervention in the 
redistricting process.177  Accordingly, the plurality held that partisan 
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable political questions.178 
Five Justices—in separate opinions—agreed that partisan 
gerrymandering is justiciable but could not settle on an acceptable standard 
to apply.179  Although Justice Kennedy was not prepared to find the claim 
justiciable under the facts of this case, he was hesitant to categorically 
foreclose review of partisan gerrymandering, and expressed hope that a 
standard might emerge in the future, possibly under the First Amendment.180  
Dissenting, Justices Breyer and Souter proposed tests intended to delineate 
the boundaries of acceptable partisan influence.181  Justice Stevens went 
further, challenging the plurality’s acceptance of political advantage as a 
permissible redistricting motive.182  He analogized partisan gerrymandering 
to racial gerrymandering as the deliberate electoral suppression of a target 
demographic,183 and a burden on freedom of association.184  Justice Stevens 
asserted that equating the two claims would obviate the difficulty of defining 
a threshold of unconstitutionality, and mitigate the plurality’s concerns about 
judicial overreach.185 
Justice Kennedy may have been overly optimistic: Following Vieth, 
even as the Court continued to recognize that partisan gerrymandering 
subverts basic democratic principles, the Justices were unable to settle on a 
manageable standard to resolve these claims.186  In League of United Latin 
                                                          
 177.  Id. at 274–75; cf. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 23 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(arguing the Elections Clause provides the States with plenary over elections, “subject only to the 
[exclusive] supervisory power of Congress”).   
 178.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306. 
 179.  Id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 180.  Id. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“First Amendment concerns arise where a State enacts 
a law that has the purpose and effect of subjecting a group of voters or their party to disfavored 
treatment by reason of their views.  In the context of partisan gerrymandering, that means that First 
Amendment concerns arise where an apportionment has the purpose and effect of burdening a group 
of voters’ representational rights.”). 
 181.  Id. at 347–50 (Souter, J., dissenting) (proposing a five-element test requiring the plaintiff 
to show an injury to their party through a departure from traditional redistricting principles); id. at 
360 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting a test based on “the unjustified use of political factors to 
entrench a minority in power,” measured by a lack of adherence to traditional districting criteria and 
by a minority party’s efforts to hold political power (emphasis omitted)). 
 182.  Id. at 324 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 183.  Id. at 326 (“[I]f the State goes ‘too far’—if it engages in ‘political gerrymandering for 
politics’ sake’—it violates the Constitution in the same way as if it undertakes ‘racial 
gerrymandering for race’s sake.”). 
 184.  Id. at 324–25 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976)). 
 185.  Id. at 339. 
 186.  Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015). 
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American Citizens v. Perry,187 the Court rejected a “sole motivation” 
approach, emphasizing the need for plaintiffs to demonstrate unconstitutional 
partisan effects.188  In Gill v. Whitford,189 the Court passed over a 
mathematical “efficiency gap” algorithm designed to calculate each party’s 
wasted votes.190  Concurring Justices in each case highlighted the 
associational harms caused by partisan discrimination and argued that 
partisan entrenchment should not be a permissible motive for redistricting.191  
These decisions heightened the judiciary’s confusion over the proper 
framework to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering, and left the justiciability 
of these claims on increasingly unstable grounds.192 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court in 
Rucho v. Common Cause held that partisan gerrymandering is a 
nonjusticiable political question.193  At the outset, the Chief Justice 
highlighted the lack of “clear, manageable, and politically neutral”194 
standards for adjudicating these claims without undermining the legitimacy 
or neutrality of the federal judiciary.195  Although partisan gerrymandering is 
“incompatible with democratic principles,”196 any partisan gerrymandering 
doctrine would require the courts to distinguish unconstitutional partisan 
                                                          
 187.  548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
 188.  Id. at 417, 418 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[A] successful claim attempting to identify 
unconstitutional acts of partisan gerrymandering must do what appellants’ sole-motivation theory 
explicitly disavows: show a burden, as measured by a reliable standard, on the complainants’ 
representational rights.”). 
 189.  138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
 190.  Id. at 1932.  Notably, the Gill plaintiffs presented extensive evidence of the process the 
Republican mapmakers used to develop, test, and select a map designed to maximize partisan 
advantage.  See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 847–53 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. 
Ct. 1916 (2018).  Nevertheless, this claim was dismissed for a lack of standing.  Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 
1932.   
 191.  Perry, 548 U.S. at 448 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing a partisan desire to dilute a 
group’s voting strength is not a legitimate government purpose for redistricting); Whitford, 138 S. 
Ct. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring) (arguing “partisan gerrymanders inflict other kinds of 
constitutional harm . . . [and] may infringe the First Amendment rights of association held by 
parties, other political organizations, and their members”). 
 192.  See supra notes 158, 177–179 (describing the courts’ trend towards nonjusticiability). 
 193.  139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019). 
 194.  Id. at 2498 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306–08 (2004) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
 195.  Id.  The Court drew heavily on Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Vieth to reason 
that “‘[w]ith uncertain limits, intervening courts . . . would risk assuming political, not legal, 
responsibility for a process that often produces ill will and distrust.’”  Id. (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. 
at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 196.  Id. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. 
Ct. 2652, 2677 (2015)); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
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entrenchment from permissible partisan advantage.197  Any attempt at such a 
delineation would invariably rest on competing notions of fairness that are 
highly subjective and incompatible with judicial neutrality.198  
The Chief Justice reached this conclusion on two primary grounds.  
First, the Court held that “federal courts are not equipped to apportion 
political power as a matter of fairness, nor is there any basis for concluding 
that they were [constitutionally] authorized to do so.”199  Although partisan 
gerrymandering was common prior to Independence, the Framers granted 
Congress exclusive supervision over the redistricting process through the 
Elections Clause.200  “At no point was there a suggestion that the federal 
courts had a role to play.”201  Second, the Court reasoned that where 
established principles of Equal Protection prohibit racial discrimination in 
redistricting,202 partisan gerrymandering is an amorphous concept subject to 
competing definitions, with no clear threshold of unconstitutionality.203  
“Any judicial decision on what is ‘fair’ in this context would be an ‘unmoored 
determination’ of the sort characteristic of a political question beyond the 
competence of the federal courts.”204 
Evaluating the standards proposed by the dissent and the lower courts, 
the Chief Justice concluded that none provided an acceptable or neutral 
boundary for adjudication.205  The First Amendment test embraced by the 
lower courts206 would preclude any consideration of partisan alignment in the 
redistricting process—an approach in conflict with the Court’s longstanding 
position that such considerations are tolerable and inevitable.207  The Equal 
Protection test invoked by Middle District of North Carolina raised serious 
administrability concerns by requiring judges to predict the outcomes of 
future elections and determine whether a disproportionate partisan advantage 
is likely to persist.208  Equally unavailing was Justice Kagan’s approach of 
using each state’s individual redistricting criteria as a neutral baseline, as 
                                                          
 197.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2498–99. 
 198.  See id. at 2500 (“The initial difficulty in settling on a ‘clear, manageable and politically 
neutral’ test for fairness is that it is not even clear what fairness looks like in this context.”). 
 199.  Id. at 2499. 
 200.  Id. at 2494–96.  
 201.  Id. at 2496. 
 202.  Id. at 2502.  
 203.  Id. at 2500. 
 204.  Id. (quoting Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)). 
 205.  Id. at 2502. 
 206.  See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text (discussing a three-prong test requiring (1) 
discriminatory intent, (2) burden on associational or representational rights, and (3) causation). 
 207.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2504 (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973)); see 
supra notes 160–164 and accompanying text. 
 208.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2503; see also supra note 40. 
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“[t]he degree of partisan advantage that the Constitution tolerates should not 
turn on criteria offered by the gerrymanderers themselves.”209 
In an extended dissent, Justice Kagan charged partisan mapmakers with 
denying citizens “the most fundamental of their constitutional rights: the 
rights to participate equally in the political process, to join with others to 
advance political beliefs, and to choose their political representatives.”210  
The dissent argued that partisan gerrymandering violates both the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.211  Where the First Amendment protects freedoms 
of political belief, association, and representation, partisan gerrymandering 
“subject[s] certain voters to ‘disfavored treatment’ . . . precisely because of 
‘their voting history [and] their expression of political views.’”212  Where the 
Fourteenth guarantees every citizen an equal opportunity to participate in 
elections, “that opportunity ‘can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the 
weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free 
exercise of the franchise.’”213 
Justice Kagan challenged the majority with abdicating its most 
fundamental duty “just when courts across the country . . . have coalesced 
around manageable judicial standards to resolve partisan gerrymandering 
claims.”214  Per Justice Kagan, the three-part First Amendment test 
enunciated by the courts below would establish clear and manageable 
standards for oversight of the apportionment process while avoiding each of 
the majority’s principal concerns.215  The use of a state’s “own political 
geography and districting criteria” as a baseline consideration would limit 
judicial subjectivity,216 and advanced computing technology would enable 
courts and litigants to accurately quantify a district map’s dilutive effect.217  
Moreover, “the combined inquiry [of predominance and substantiality] used 
in these cases set[s] the bar high, so that courts could intervene in the worst 
partisan gerrymanders, but no others.”218 
                                                          
 209.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2505. 
 210.  Id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 211.  Id. at 2514. 
 212.  Id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  
 213.  Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964)). 
 214.  Id. at 2509. 
 215.  Id. at 2516. 
 216.  Id. at 2521 (emphasis omitted).  
 217.  Id. at 2517–18 (discussing one example technique that uses a computer algorithm to 
compare the challenged map to thousands of simulated district configurations based on a state’s 
neutral districting criteria).  “[T]he same technologies and data that today facilitate extreme partisan 
gerrymanders also enable courts to discover them, by exposing just how much they dilute votes.”  
Id. 
 218.  Id. at 2522. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
The holding in Rucho v. Common Cause was the result of the Court’s 
decision to frame the gerrymandering problem as a question of impact, rather 
than an impermissible legislative motive.  This Note proposes that a district 
map drawn with the predominant intent to secure partisan advantage violates 
the First Amendment as a form of viewpoint discrimination and an injury to 
political participatory rights.  Section IV.A provides the foundation of this 
analysis by highlighting the Court’s duty to protect the democratic process 
against obstruction and distortion.219  Section IV.B challenges the Court’s 
longstanding acceptance of partisan advantage as the predominant objective 
of the redistricting process.220  Section IV.C proposes an intent-based First 
Amendment standard to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims on a 
theory of viewpoint discrimination.221  Finally, Section IV.D highlights the 
inapplicability of the political question doctrine in light of this framework.222 
A.  The Duty to Act: The Court’s Responsibility to Preserve the 
Framework of Democracy 
The regime of heightened scrutiny established in United States v. 
Carolene Products demonstrates that the Court has “a role to play” in 
moderating extreme partisan gerrymanders.223  Professor John Hart Ely 
described Footnote Four as articulating a “representation-reinforcing” model 
of judicial review,224 characterized by protections for the process of selecting 
decisionmakers, rather than specific substantive outcomes.225  Under this 
approach, the Court has a longstanding duty to “clear[] the channels of 
political change”226 by (1) striking down laws that obstruct the representation 
of the majority will and (2) regulating the use of power by political insiders 
                                                          
 219.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 220.  See supra Section IV.B. 
 221.  See supra Section IV.C. 
 222.  See supra Section IV.D. 
 223.  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311–12 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“Allegations of unconstitutional bias in apportionment are most serious claims, for we have long 
believed that ‘the right to vote’ is one of ‘those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities.’” (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938))); 
cf. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2019). 
 224.  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 102, 117 
(1980).  Professor Ely further notes that courts, as neutral decisionmakers removed from the political 
process, are uniquely suited to this task.  Id. at 88, 102. 
 225.  Id. at 101–02 (emphasizing that this theory of review recognizes “the unacceptability of 
the claim that appointed and life-tenured judges are better reflectors of conventional values than 
elected representatives, devoting itself instead to policing the mechanisms by which the system 
seeks to ensure that our elected representatives will actually represent”). 
 226.  Id. at 105. 
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to prevent the suppression of political outsiders.227  The rights of speech and 
suffrage are closely guarded to guarantee unfettered access to the political 
process.228  Likewise, laws that target minorities are constitutionally suspect 
not only by virtue of their stigmatic effect, but also their propensity to insulate 
those groups from political influence.229 
Decades of election law jurisprudence highlight the importance of the 
Court’s responsibility to the framework of democracy.230  The right to vote 
is protected due to its centrality to the democratic process—in Harper v. 
Virginia Board of Elections and Yick Wo v. Hopkins,231 the Court described 
the franchise as “preservative of all other rights.”232  Accordingly, Professor 
Ely’s “channels of political change” are the focal point of the Court’s ballot 
access and redistricting doctrines.233  Anderson balancing turns on the value 
of election regulations to a functioning democracy: Challenged regulations 
are upheld when their contribution to the effectiveness or the integrity of the 
election process outweighs the burdens they place on the franchise.234  
Likewise, each of the established redistricting doctrines is designed to protect 
political outsiders against electoral disempowerment235: Malapportionment 
is strictly scrutinized as a form of vote dilution and a “debasement” of the 
                                                          
 227.  Id. at 101, 103. 
 228.  Id. at 105, 117 (arguing “the courts should be heavily involved in reviewing impediments 
to free speech, publication, and political association . . . because they are critical to the functioning 
of an open and effective democratic process” and that “unblocking stoppages in the democratic 
process is what judicial review ought preeminently to be about, and denial of the vote seems the 
quintessential stoppage”). 
 229.  Id. at 86–87 (“[W]hat are sometimes characterized as two conflicting American ideals—
the protection of popular government on the one hand, and the protection of minorities from denials 
of equal concern and respect on the other—in fact can be understood as arising from a common 
duty of representation.”). 
 230.  See supra Section II.A.3.  
 231.  118 U.S. 356 (1886).  
 232.  See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 233.  ELY, supra note 224, at 105, 117; accord Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793–94 
(1983) (“‘The inquiry is whether the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens “the 
availability of political opportunity.”’ . . . [S]uch restrictions threaten to reduce diversity and 
competition in the marketplace of ideas.”) (citation omitted) (quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 
957, 964 (1982)); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 557, 555 (1964) (“The right to vote freely for the 
candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right 
strike at the heart of representative government.”); see also supra note 223. 
 234.  Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789; see supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text. 
 235.  Ely, supra note 224, at 117 (emphasizing that the right to vote is “essential to the 
democratic process” and “cannot safely be left to our elected representatives, who have an obvious 
vested interest in the status quo”).  
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franchise,236 while racial gerrymandering is categorically proscribed as the 
political suppression of a discrete and insular minority.237 
Partisan gerrymandering is no less “incompatible with democratic 
principles,” and no less deleterious to “the channels of political change.”238  
As Justice Kagan noted in Rucho, the maps drawn in Maryland and North 
Carolina “promote[] partisanship above respect for the popular will.”239  
These gerrymanders undermine the majoritarian process by entrenching 
insiders in power, and frustrating the ability of outsiders to translate votes 
into representation.240  They render elections noncompetitive and deter public 
participation in the democratic process.241  They generate “a politics of 
polarization and dysfunction,” reinforcing a pervasive belief that officials 
owe their allegiance to the members of their party—rather than the voting 
public.242  These trends have not escaped judicial notice: The Supreme Court 
has consistently denounced gerrymandering as destructive to the foundations 
of our democracy.243  It necessarily follows that the Court has a duty to act. 
Instead, the Rucho majority deferred this responsibility by construing 
the Elections Clause as an exclusive grant of authority to Congress and the 
States.244  This reasoning, an echo of the “political thicket” criticized by 
                                                          
 236.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or 
dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise 
of the franchise.”).  
 237.  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (“When a district obviously is created solely to 
effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to 
believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their 
constituency as a whole.”). 
 238.  Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019) (quoting Ariz. State Legislature 
v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)); ELY, supra note 224, at 105; 
see supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 239.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 240.  See supra notes 4, 8 and accompanying text. 
 241.  See Hayes & McKee, supra note 8, at 1009; e.g., Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 
508, 524 (D. Md. 2018) (noting voter turnout among Republicans decreased by as much as sixteen 
percent in counties affected by the Democratic gerrymander in Maryland and concluding that 
“[m]embers of the Republican Party in the Sixth District . . . were burdened in fundraising, 
attracting volunteers, campaigning, and generating interest in voting in an atmosphere of general 
confusion and apathy”), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 242.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 331 
(2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The parallel danger of a partisan gerrymander is that the 
representative will perceive that the people who put her in power are those who drew the map rather 
than those who cast ballots . . . .”). 
 243.  See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text. 
 244.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2496 (“The Framers were aware of electoral districting problems and 
considered what to do about them.  They settled on a characteristic approach, assigning the issue to 
the state legislatures, expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress.”).  Notably, the 
majority argues that review of the redistricting process was committed to Congress in the context 
of partisan gerrymandering—but not in the context of racial gerrymandering or malapportionment.  
Id. at 2495–96.  This is a meaningless distinction.  There is nothing in the Constitution that suggests 
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Justices Frankfurter and Harlan,245 was soundly repudiated by the Supreme 
Court in Baker v. Carr, Wesberry v. Sanders, and Reynolds v. Sims.246  
Moreover, decades of judicial intervention to prevent abuse of the elections 
process demonstrate that the Elections Clause is not an absolute barrier to 
judicial review.247  Although elected officials have authority over the time, 
place, and manner of elections,248 the presumption of constitutionality 
attendant to their discretion is narrowed when their actions restrict the 
unfettered operations of the democratic process.249  And while “judges have 
no license to reallocate political power between the two major political 
parties,”250 courts have an established duty to prevent those parties from 
commandeering the machinery of the state.251 
B.  The Gaffney Gaffe: Rejecting Partisan Gain as the Dominant 
Redistricting Motive 
Racial and partisan gerrymandering share a common core in their 
damaging effects on the majoritarian democratic process.252  As Justice 
Stevens noted in Vieth v. Jubelirer, “the essence of a gerrymander is the same 
regardless of whether the group is identified as racial or political.”253  Each 
practice involves the electoral suppression of a specific demographic by 
reducing its ability to preserve its interests through the political process.254  
                                                          
the judiciary may override the mandate of the Elections Clause to review some Equal Protection 
violations, but not others.  See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1985) (“That the 
characteristics of the complaining group are not immutable or that the group has not been subject to 
the same historical stigma may be relevant to the manner in which the case is adjudicated, but these 
differences do not justify a refusal to entertain such a case.”). 
 245.  Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946); see supra notes 124–138 and accompanying 
text. 
 246.  See supra notes 142–143 and accompanying text. 
 247.  See supra notes 101–112 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s evaluation of 
election regulations under the First and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 248.  U.S. CONST. art. 1., § 4. 
 249.  ELY, supra note 224, at 117 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 
621, 628 (1969)); see supra note 92, 101–105 and accompanying text. 
 250.  Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019).  But see Gaffney v. Cummings, 
412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (holding that a State’s allocation of political power is “not wholly exempt” 
from judicial scrutiny). 
 251.  See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (emphasizing that “care must be taken not to 
confuse the interest of partisan organizations with governmental interests”). 
 252.  See supra notes 169, 229. 
 253.  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 335 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 254.  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (noting the distortion of political representation 
created by racial gerrymandering); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132–33 (1986) (“In both 
contexts, the question is whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to 
effectively influence the political process.”); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 754 (finding districts vulnerable 
where “racial or political groups have been fenced out of the political process and their voting 
strength invidiously minimized”).  
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Each practice undermines legislative neutrality and accountability by 
reducing the incentives for elected officials to represent political outsiders.255  
And while many of the most pervasive harms caused by racial discrimination 
are not present in the partisan context, racial gerrymandering cases have 
consistently been decided on political egalitarian grounds.256  Whether the 
target group is defined by its race or its political identity, its representation is 
no less diluted by the cracking and packing of votes than by a distortion in 
its district’s population or a restriction on its access to the ballot.257  It follows 
that partisan advantage, like racial discrimination, should not be considered 
“an ordinary and lawful motive” in the redistricting process.258  
Despite these commonalities, the Court has embraced the misguided 
notion that “a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political 
gerrymandering.”259  This distinction can be traced to Gaffney v. Cummings, 
where the Court held that a benign consideration of partisan interests during 
apportionment is constitutionally permissible.260  Due to the increasingly 
broad construction of this holding,261 redistricting doctrine has splintered: 
Partisan gerrymanders are adjudicated based on their effects on subsequent 
elections, while racial gerrymanders are strictly scrutinized based on intent 
alone.262  This bifurcation has left the Court to grapple with the “unmoored 
determination” of “how much” partisan entrenchment it is willing to 
tolerate.263  In turn, this framing of the issue as a matter of degree led to 
decades of confusion over the proper method to adjudicate partisan 
                                                          
 255.  Compare Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642, 648, with Vieth, 541 U.S. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing the distortion of incentives caused by each form of gerrymandering). 
 256.  See, e.g., the White Primaries, supra note 109; see also Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648 (finding 
racial gerrymandering “altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy”); 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43, 98 (1986) (striking down a redistricting plan under the 
Voting Rights Act where “the political processes leading to nomination or election . . . are not 
equally open to participation by members of a [protected class]” (alterations in original)). 
 257.  See supra text accompanying notes 169, 213. 
 258.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 324–26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the State goes ‘too far’—if it 
engages in ‘political gerrymandering for politics’ sake’—it violates the Constitution in the same 
way as if it undertakes ‘racial gerrymandering for race’s sake.’”). 
 259.  Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2497 (2019) (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 
U.S. 541, 551 (1999) and citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) for this principle). 
 260.  See supra notes 160–161.  
 261.  See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text.  Equally striking, the doctrinal evolution 
from Gaffney’s benign classification approach to Cromartie’s acceptance of “constitutional political 
gerrymandering” arguably emerged in dicta.  Constitutional Validity of Congressional 
Redistricting, 82 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2014).  The Rucho Court, like the Cromartie Court before it, 
exclusively cited racial gerrymandering cases for the broader proposition.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497 
(citing Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 551; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 
U.S. 900, 916 (1995); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646). 
 262.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2496–97 (highlighting the difference between the two claims). 
 263.  Id. at 2500–01; see supra note 204.  
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gerrymandering claims,264 and culminated in the political question holding in 
Rucho.265 
The divergence of these standards was—and continues to be—grounded 
in structural logic incongruous with our constitutional system.266  In Gaffney, 
the Court reasoned that “districting inevitably has and is intended to have 
substantial political consequences” as “politics and political considerations 
are inseparable from districting and apportionment.”267  Stated more plainly 
in Rucho: “To hold that legislators cannot take partisan interests into account 
when drawing district lines would essentially countermand the Framers’ 
decision to entrust districting to political entities.”268  This “boys-will-be-
boys” line of reasoning undermines the system of checks and balances that is 
central to the structure of our government.269  It contradicts the majority’s 
stated hesitation to allow politically-motivated actors to moderate their self-
interest.270  And it misrepresents the intent of the Framers, many of whom 
detested partisan gerrymandering,271 and considered factionalism an 
existential threat to the system they designed.272  
The majority’s administrability concerns fare no better.  As the Court 
has already acknowledged, every legislature will inevitably be aware of race 
                                                          
 264.  See supra Section II.B.2. 
 265.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497 (“Partisan gerrymandering claims have proved far more difficult 
to adjudicate.  The basic reason is that, while it is illegal for a jurisdiction to depart from the one-
person, one-vote rule, or to engage in racial discrimination in districting, ‘a jurisdiction may engage 
in constitutional political gerrymandering.’” (quoting Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 551, and citing 
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973)); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 128, 132 
(1986) (drawing from Gaffney’s benign classification approach and its holding on the inevitability 
of partisan effects to reason that “the mere lack of proportional representation will not be sufficient 
to prove unconstitutional discrimination” and hold that proving such discrimination requires a 
showing of consistent degradation). 
 266.  See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 267.  412 U.S. at 753. 
 268.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497. 
 269.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (“Ambition must 
be made to counteract ambition . . . . In framing a government which is to be administered by men 
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”). 
 270.  See supra text accompanying note 209; accord Ely, supra note 224 at 117 (emphasizing 
that the duty to preserve the democratic process “cannot safely be left to our elected representatives, 
who have an obvious vested interest in the status quo”). 
 271.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[P]artisan gerrymandering goes back to 
the Republic’s earliest days.  (As does vociferous opposition to it.)”); accord Common Cause v. 
Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 844–45 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (reviewing commentary on founding era 
authority to confirm public distaste for gerrymandering), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019); Khomina, 
supra note 6. 
 272.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton) (characterizing the Union as “a barrier 
against domestic faction and insurrection”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (“When a 
majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government . . . enables it to sacrifice to its 
ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.”).  
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during the apportionment process, just as it will be aware of the state’s 
political composition.273  Moreover, redistricting will inevitably affect racial 
demographics as readily as political parties.274  These inevitabilities have not 
rendered racial gerrymandering unmanageable: The Court simply chose a 
better path for these claims by identifying predominant intent as the threshold 
of unconstitutionality.275  The same approach would be well-suited to address 
partisan gerrymandering.276  Some partisan considerations and political 
effects are an inevitable consequence of the redistricting process and must be 
tolerated.277  Once the intent to obtain partisan advantage predominates—
once all neutral considerations have been subordinated to partisan ends—a 
constitutional line has been crossed, and the Court must intervene.278 
C.  This Much Is Too Much: Partisan Gerrymandering as a Form of 
Viewpoint Discrimination 
The First Amendment would provide a stronger foundation for partisan 
gerrymandering claims.279  The freedoms of association and representation 
                                                          
 273.  Compare supra note 145 (discussing inevitable awareness of race), with supra notes 161, 
207 and accompanying text (discussing inevitable awareness of political effects). 
 274.  E.g., Olga Pierce & Kate Rabinowitz, “Partisan” Gerrymandering Is Still About Race, 
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 9, 2017, 6:48 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/partisan-
gerrymandering-is-still-about-race (“Manipulating a map to move around Wisconsin Democrats 
also means manipulating a map to move around Wisconsin voters who are not white . . . .”). 
 275.  See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text. 
 276.  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 339 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I would apply 
the standard set forth in the Shaw cases and ask whether the legislature allowed partisan 
considerations to dominate and control the lines drawn . . . . Such a narrow test would cover only a 
few meritorious claims, but it would preclude extreme abuses . . . .”).   
 277.  See supra text accompanying note 267. 
 278.  See supra note 276.  Compare Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (finding that to 
prove predominance “a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral 
districting principles . . . to racial considerations”), with Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 
2520–21 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (finding “the quest for partisan gain made the State[s] 
override [their] own political geography and districting criteria” (emphasis omitted)). 
 279.  See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 324 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“‘[P]olitical belief and association 
constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment,’ and discriminatory 
governmental decisions that burden fundamental First Amendment interests are subject to strict 
scrutiny.” (citation omitted) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976))); supra note 111 
and accompanying text (discussing connection between voting and speech); see also Simon Brewer, 
Back to Basics: Why Partisan Gerrymandering Violates the First Amendment, YALE LAW SCH., 
MEDIA FREEDOM & INFO. ACCESS CLINIC (Mar. 12, 2019), https://law.yale.edu/mfia/case-
disclosed/back-basics-why-partisan-gerrymandering-violates-first-amendment (“The First 
Amendment is the appropriate constitutional provision through which to evaluate partisan 
gerrymandering because, quite simply, voting is political speech and partisan gerrymanders attempt 
to burden that speech.”). 
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are vital to “the channels of political change”280—already these protections 
have been extended to encompass the right to vote and its ancillary political 
activities.281  These political participatory rights are directly undermined by 
partisan gerrymandering, which may be characterized as a form of viewpoint 
discrimination based on political belief.282  Accordingly, the possibility of a 
First Amendment standard has been a persistent undercurrent in the Supreme 
Court’s partisan gerrymandering decisions.283  Recharacterizing partisan 
gerrymandering in this context would align with the Court’s responsibility to 
the democratic process,284 harmonize the racial and partisan gerrymandering 
doctrines,285 and draw a clear constitutional line to provide the foundation of 
a judicially manageable standard.286 
The three-part test embraced in Common Cause v. Rucho and Lamone 
v. Benisek fails to address the underlying issue.287  By continuing to measure 
the constitutionality of partisan gerrymanders based on their effects, this test 
retains the Gaffney bifurcation and all of its attendant line-drawing 
problems.288  The threshold determination that vote dilution must occur “to 
such a degree that it result[s] in a tangible and concrete adverse effect”289 is 
no less subjective than the unmanageable “persistent degradation” standard 
adopted in Davis v. Bandemer and rejected in Vieth v. Jubelirer.290  While 
modern technology can facilitate an objective comparison to a state’s 
traditional redistricting criteria,291 judges would nonetheless be required to 
                                                          
 280.  ELY, supra note 224, at 105–06 (highlighting the centrality of First Amendment political 
participatory rights to a functioning democratic process); see supra notes 103–104 and 
accompanying text.  
 281.  See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text. 
 282.  See Brewer, supra note 279 (“The Constitution forbids viewpoint discrimination because 
it distorts the relationship between citizens and their elected officials.”); accord Rucho v. Common 
Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2514 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“By diluting the votes of certain 
citizens, the State frustrates their efforts to translate those affiliations into political effectiveness.”); 
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]hese allegations involve the First Amendment 
interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral process, 
their voting history, their association with a political party, or their expression of political views.”). 
 283.  See supra notes 180, 191.  
 284.  See supra note 228 and accompanying text.  
 285.  See supra notes 258, 276 and accompanying text.  
 286.  See Rucho, 139 S. Ct at 2521–22 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (offering “a first-cut answer: This 
much is too much”). 
 287.  See supra text accompanying notes 40–43. 
 288.  See supra Section IV.B. 
 289.  Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 515 (D. Md. 2018), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 
(2019). 
 290.  Cf. supra notes 173–178 and accompanying text (discussing Bandemer). 
 291.  See supra notes 190, 217 and accompanying text; accord Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2517 (Kagan, 
J., dissenting) (observing that the evidence presented by the North Carolina and Maryland plaintiffs 
demonstrates “how the same technologies and data that today facilitate extreme partisan 
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make an “unmoored determination” about the impact a map will have on 
future elections.292  More fundamentally, allowing partisan interests to 
dominate the redistricting process absent extreme adverse effects would do 
little to mitigate the harmful impact of these gerrymanders on “the channels 
of political change”—from the distortion, ossification, and polarization of 
legislative politics to the breakdown of incentives for lawmakers to represent 
their voters.293 
Given the harms produced by these gerrymanders, Carolene Products 
demands more.294  Our democracy demands more.295  Justice Stevens, 
dissenting in Vieth, had the right approach: equalizing the racial and partisan 
gerrymandering doctrines by applying strict scrutiny whenever either 
impermissible motive predominates.296  The First Amendment already 
prohibits viewpoint discrimination in many official contexts, from campaign 
finance, to political patronage, to party organization and advocacy.297  There 
is no reason why this essential protection for the rights of political belief and 
association should be blind to this fundamentally political arena.298  Partisan 
gerrymanders frustrate and hinder the effectiveness of individual votes—the 
most important form of political expression299—and chill essential political 
activities at the heart of these freedoms.300  Moreover, the policy concerns 
that prohibit consideration of partisanship in patronage terminations are 
particularly resonant here, as partisan gerrymandering directly subordinates 
the interests of the state to partisan gain.301   
Therefore, the Court should hold that a district map drawn with the 
predominant intent to maximize partisan advantage is a violation of the First 
                                                          
gerrymanders also enable courts to discover them, by exposing just how much they dilute votes” 
(citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 312–13 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
 292.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500; see supra text accompanying note 204.  
 293.  ELY, supra note 224, at 105; see supra notes 239–242 and accompanying text. 
 294.  See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 295.  See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2519 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“By substantially diluting the votes 
of citizens favoring their rivals, the politicians of one party had succeeded in entrenching themselves 
in office.  They had beat democracy.”). 
 296. . Vieth, 541 U.S. at 326–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 297.  See supra notes 119–127. 
 298.  Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 928 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (noting that“[i]t 
defies reason that the First Amendment—which ‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to 
political speech” would provide greater protections to “associations of individuals organized 
principally for economic gain” than to “associations of individuals principally organized to advance 
political beliefs”), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 299.  See supra note 111. 
 300.  See supra notes 239–242 and accompanying text. 
 301.  Compare text accompanying note 121 (observing the Court’s invocation of this policy in 
political patronage cases) with text accompanying note 242 (discussing how gerrymandering 
encourages elected officials to value party loyalty over loyalty to their electorate). 
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Amendment.302  This ruling would confer several benefits and mitigate the 
Rucho Court’s concerns.  First, a standard grounded in intent alone would 
ameliorate partisan gerrymandering doctrine’s persistent line-drawing 
problems.303  Although any evaluation of legislative intent entails some 
subjectivity, judges would no longer be expected to predict the effects of a 
map on future elections—the courts would be freed of the impossible 
quantification of fairness that comes with the question: “How much is too 
much?”304  Second, this ruling would reciprocally strengthen racial 
gerrymandering doctrine, as rampant partisan interests have provided 
lawmakers with a consistent shield against racial gerrymandering claims.305  
Finally, the inherent difficulty of demonstrating predominant intent would 
alleviate the majority’s concerns about overreach.306  Plaintiffs will bear the 
burden of proving that all neutral criteria were subordinated to partisan 
ends:307 the extensive evidentiary records compiled in Benisek and Common 
Cause demonstrate that this is not an easy task.308  
With predominant intent as the core constitutional inquiry, the canonical 
gerrymandering cases can be readily synthetized into a standard to adjudicate 
these claims.309  As in Benisek and Common Cause, courts may have access 
to unambiguous statements by the lawmakers responsible for redistricting, or 
hard data demonstrating that partisan interests were at the forefront of the 
redistricting process.310  Evidence that the majority party distorted the 
                                                          
 302.  See supra note 276.  
 303.  See supra Section IV.C. 
 304.  Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2501 (2019); accord supra notes 165, 265 and 
accompanying text (discussing the bifurcation’s effect in muddying the doctrine and contributing to 
the Rucho holding). 
 305.  See supra notes 150–157 (discussing difficulty of adjudicating racial gerrymandering 
claims when lawmakers demonstrate mixed motives); accord Igor Derysh, Gerrymander Guru’s 
Secret Files: He Used Racial Data to Disenfranchise Black Voters, SALON (Sept. 11, 2019, 10:00 
AM), https://www.salon.com/2019/09/11/gerrymander-gurus-secret-files-he-used-racial-data-to-
disenfranchise-black-voters/ (describing how a Republican mapmaker in North Carolina secretly 
used racial demographics to develop the maps at issue in Rucho). 
 306.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2522 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he combined inquiry used in these 
cases set the bar high, so that courts could intervene in the worst partisan gerrymanders, but no 
others.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 284–85 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (noting the difficulties 
associated with determining partisan motive). 
 307.  See supra note 278 and accompanying text (discussing standard for predominance). 
 308.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2517–19 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (recounting the “overwhelming” 
direct evidence of predominant purpose established by the lower courts); see supra notes 44–45 
(summarizing this evidence). 
 309.  See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 321–22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“With purpose as the ultimate 
inquiry, other considerations have supplied ready standards for testing the lawfulness of a 
gerrymander.”).  
 310.  E.g., Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 847–53 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (noting heavy use 
of voter data and overriding prioritization of partisan gain in spreadsheets used during the map 
drafting process; observing mapmaker’s testimony that “[w]e have an opportunity and an obligation 
to draw these maps that Republicans haven’t had in decades”), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018); 
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apportionment process by redistricting behind closed doors, privately hiring 
and consulting with a partisan firm, or excluding the minority party from 
redistricting deliberations is remarkably common, and highly persuasive.311  
Alternatively, the circumstantial evidence standards embraced in racial 
gerrymandering cases are readily applicable to partisan claims—such as 
bizarre shapes that mark substantial departures from a state’s traditional 
redistricting criteria.312  Likewise, while disproportionate representation is 
insufficient in isolation, extreme disparities and flipped results may lend 
weight to this analysis.313   
D.  Ducking the Question: Refuting the Supreme Court’s Application of 
the Political Question Doctrine 
Properly characterized as a violation of First Amendment political 
participatory rights,314 partisan gerrymandering is necessarily justiciable.315  
Although political question has been read as a largely prudential mechanism 
of abstention,316 the doctrine is best construed as an exercise of constitutional 
                                                          
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 116 n.5 (1986) (noting mapmakers intended “to save as many 
incumbent Republicans as possible”); see supra notes 29–30, 36, 44 and accompanying text 
(reviewing legislative testimony and data used in Benisek and Common Cause).  
 311.  E.g., Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 847–53 (describing in great detail the process used by 
expert consultants to calculate partisan performance of potential maps and strategically select the 
strongest alternative); Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535 (M.D. Penn. 2002) (noting 
Republicans developed a map under pressure from national party officials as a “punitive measure 
against Democrats . . . effectively ignor[ing] all Democratic members of the General Assembly”), 
aff’d, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1495 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (observing 
that Republicans hired a private firm to develop the challenged map, excluded Democrats from 
mapmaking process, and revealed the proposed map to Democrats in the final hours of the 
legislative session), rev’d, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); see supra notes 28, 37 and accompanying text 
(describing similar incidents in Benisek and Common Cause). 
 312.  Compare Goumillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960) (finding “uncouth twenty-
eight-sided figure” demonstrative of racial discrimination), with Bandemer, 603 F. Supp. at 1493 
(observing that challenged plan “is replete with ‘uncouth’ and ‘bizarre’ configurations” that suggest 
partisan motive).  See also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 340 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting one district “looms like a dragon descending on Philadelphia from the west”); Fleming, 
supra note 8 (comparing Maryland district to a “praying mantis”); Ella Nilsen, North Carolina’s 
Extreme Gerrymandering Could Save the House Republican Majority, VOX (May 8, 2018, 11:00 
AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/5/8/17271766/north-carolina-
gerrymandering-2018-midterms-partisan-redistricting/ (comparing North Carolina districts to “an 
octopus” and a “mutant crab”). 
 313.  E.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 411 (2006) (observing 
that Republicans carried 59% of the popular vote but won only 43% of corresponding seats under a 
prior map); Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 853 (noting that Republicans won 48.6% of the popular 
vote and received 60% of the available seats). 
 314.  See supra Section IV.C. 
 315.  See supra notes 80, 143, and accompanying text. 
 316.  See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text; see also Ron Parker, Is The Political 
Question Doctrine Jurisdictional or Prudential?, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 255, 255, 272–74 (2016) 
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interpretation, aimed at defining the limits of textually committed political 
discretion.317  This approach reflects the doctrine’s origins as an 
implementation of the separation of powers.318  From this perspective, the 
prudential Baker factors chiefly inform the core question of whether a 
constitutional commitment is exclusive—they are not intended to be raised 
on a standalone basis to defer judicial review.319  Moreover, these prudential 
considerations share a common nucleus with the presumption of legislative 
constitutionality: Both doctrines are a manifestation of judicial respect for the 
majoritarian process.320  Where “the channels of political change” have been 
distorted or undermined, that deference has no applicability, and the balance 
shifts in favor of intervention.321  
As a function of the separation of powers, the political question doctrine 
has no force when the Constitution has been violated.322  Any determination 
that a case presents a nonjusticiable political question rests on deference to 
the policymaking authority of a coordinate branch of government.323  The 
scope of this authority is constrained by the Constitution: Any political actor 
that violates a constitutional provision has abused its discretion.324  From 
Marbury v. Madison to Baker v. Carr, this distinction—between a valid 
exercise of policymaking authority and the invalid contravention of 
                                                          
(arguing, largely on surplusage grounds, that only the first Baker factor is constitutional, while the 
remaining six are independent prudential considerations). 
 317.  Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L. J. 597, 601–06 
(1976); accord Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1976) (declining to find a political question 
and holding “our determination of the limits on state executive power contained in the 
Constitution is in proper keeping with our primary responsibility of interpreting that document”); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been 
committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch 
exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional 
interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court . . . .”). 
 318.  See supra text accompanying note 76. 
 319.  See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text (demonstrating this pattern). 
 320.  Compare supra note 62 and accompanying text (regarding political question), with supra 
note 87 and accompanying text (regarding presumption of constitutionality). 
 321.  ELY, supra note 224, at 105; see also supra Section IV.A. 
 322.  See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 226 (holding “[t]he courts cannot reject as ‘no law suit’ a bona 
fide controversy as to whether some action denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority” 
and finding no political question where “[t]he question . . . is the consistency of state action with 
the Federal Constitution”). 
 323.  See supra note 62 and accompanying text (highlighting core principle of majoritarian 
deference); see also Henkin, supra note 317 at 597–98 (recognizing that this deference is “axiomatic 
in a system of constitutional government built on the separation of powers” and arguing that “as 
long as the political branches act within their constitutional powers, whether they have done wisely 
or well is a ‘political question’ which is not for the courts to consider”). 
 324.  See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976) (finding “there can be no impairment of 
executive power . . . where actions pursuant to that power are impermissible under the Constitution); 
accord Henkin, supra note 317, at 598 (recognizing that the courts’ concern to be “whether the 
political branches of government . . . have exceeded constitutional limitations”). 
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constitutional norms—has consistently been determinative.325  Therefore, the 
political question analysis inherently requires an exercise of constitutional 
interpretation, not judicial abstention.326  If no violation has occurred, or the 
boundary is impossible to discern, the case presents a political question and 
judicial restraint will prevail.327  If the line has been crossed and a violation 
is clear, there can be no political question.328 
This inquiry does not carve entire issues out of the scope of judicial 
review simply because they are difficult to adjudicate with precision.329  In 
Baker, the Court recognized that the political question doctrine is not 
amenable to “semantic cataloguing,” as constitutional violations will only be 
apparent under the unique circumstances of each case.330  Therefore, while 
the legal issues presented in two cases may be similar, the presence of a 
political question will vary on the facts.331  This piecemeal approach 
advances the underlying principles of judicial restraint by encouraging the 
Court to draw lines gradually and avoid implicating the separation of 
powers.332  Nowhere is its efficacy more apparent than in the evolution of 
redistricting doctrine following Baker.333  Although the touchstone rules for 
malapportionment and racial gerrymandering were declared in decisive 
cases,334 these standards have taken shape over time, their contours fleshed 
                                                          
 325.  This distinction emerged as early as Marbury, where the Court distinguished the valid 
exercise of executive discretion with the President’s defiance of a ministerial duty imposed by 
statute or constitutional provision.  See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.  In a modern 
context, the distinction is demonstrated by the Court’s deference to the Senate on matters of 
impeachment—and its corresponding intervention into the House of Representatives’ attempt to 
disqualify duly elected members.  Compare supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing Nixon 
v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229 (1993)), with supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text 
(discussing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)). 
 326.  See Henkin, supra note 317, at 598, 601, 602 n.17 (“[T]he result is an interpretation of the 
Constitution, not abstention by the courts on their own initiative from their own institutional 
considerations of wisdom and policy or from ad hoc prudential concerns . . . .”). 
 327.  See supra text accompanying notes 81–86. 
 328.  See supra notes 80, 85–86, and accompanying text. 
 329.  But see supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.  Regardless, even in the context of the 
Guaranty Clause, the Court has typically considered the substance of each case before reaching its 
political question determination.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223–24 (1962), for an overview 
of these decisions.  
 330.  Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 331.  Id. at 217–18. 
 332.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964) (“Developing a body of doctrine on a case-
by-case basis appears to us to provide the most satisfactory means of arriving at detailed 
constitutional requirements in the area of state legislative apportionment.”); see supra note 89 
(discussing this approach in the context of the presumption of constitutionality). 
 333.  See supra Section II.B.2. 
 334.  See supra notes 131, 144, 142, and accompanying text. 
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out through the resolution of individual disputes and the confluence of 
resultant standards.335 
 Therefore, the Court’s determination that partisan gerrymandering 
claims are categorically nonjusticiable is fundamentally incompatible with 
its concession that partisan gerrymandering is undemocratic336 and its 
recognition that extreme partisan gerrymanders are unconstitutional.337  This 
holding is flatly inconsistent with the doctrine’s origins in Baker, and 
deleterious to the balance of restraint and modulation at the core of the 
separation of powers.338   
 Of course, gerrymandering involves challenging and convoluted issues: 
as disputes arise and the standard is tested, courts would find some cases 
difficult to decide.339  But no good doctrine is built in a day—judicial restraint 
and stare decisis demand that constitutional rules are developed over time.340  
Accordingly, the possibility of difficult cases should not preclude redress of 
clear violations.341  Rucho would have been a great place to start: In Maryland 
and North Carolina, the dominant party’s efforts to curtail “the channels of 
political change” were predominant, shameless, and entirely obvious.342  
Instead of skirting around the specter of future disputes, and attempting to 
articulate a broad definition of fairness in a single case,343 the Court should 
have done what it has always done: apply a narrow rule to these unambiguous 
facts, and let Rucho serve as a clear starting point for the organic evolution 
of a workable doctrine.  
                                                          
 335.  See, e.g., the malapportionment cases, supra notes 130–143.  
 336.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 337.  E.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding 
unconstitutionality predicated “on a conclusion that the classifications, though generally 
permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative 
objective”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (White, J.) (finding unconstitutionality 
“where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to 
influence the political process effectively”); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) 
(finding unconstitutionality where “racial or political groups have been fenced out of the political 
process and their voting strength invidiously minimized”). 
 338.  See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 339.  See Derysh, supra note 305 (illustrating how Republican redistricting specialists carefully 
masked racial discrimination in the North Carolina gerrymanders at issue in Rucho). 
 340.  See, for example, the malapportionment cases, supra notes 131–134 and accompanying 
text. 
 341.  See supra notes 80, 143, and accompanying text. 
 342.  ELY, supra note 224, at 105; see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2517 (2019) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (observing the “overwhelming direct evidence” of intent in these cases); see 
also supra text accompanying notes 25–39. 
 343.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499–500 (majority opinion) (arguing “it is not even clear what 
fairness looks like in this context.”).  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s political question holding in Rucho v. Common 
Cause344 was the predictable endpoint of decades of confusion over the 
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims.345  But it was also the 
foreseeable consequence of the Court’s decision to allow partisan interests to 
dominate the redistricting process, and to evaluate gerrymanders based on 
their effects, rather than the underlying legislative motive.346  Instead of 
perpetuating this framing, the Court should have drawn the line at 
predominant intent, and held that a map drawn to “subordinate adherents of 
one political party and entrench a rival party in power”347 is unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination in its purest form.348  A First Amendment standard 
grounded in intent would ameliorate the confusion that has hindered the 
evolution of gerrymandering doctrine, and reclaim the Court’s role as a 
steward of “the channels of political change.”349  Such a standard would be 
entirely justiciable, amenable to the wealth of circumstantial evidence 
techniques that have been used to evaluate legislative intent for decades.350  
It would be balanced by a predominance threshold well-calibrated to 
constrain judicial intervention and preserve the separation of powers.351  And 
it would provide an answer to the Court’s lingering, impossible question: 
When asked “how much” partisan entrenchment it is willing to tolerate, the 
Court could simply declare: “None at all.”352 
                                                          
 344.  See supra Part III. 
 345.  See supra Part II.B. 
 346.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 347.  Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015). 
 348.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 349.  ELY, supra note 224, at 105; see supra Part IV.A. 
 350.  See supra notes 308–313 and accompanying text.  
 351.  See supra Part IV.C.; see also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2523 (2019) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 
